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ASBESTOS TRUST TRANSPARENCY 
Mark A. Behrens* 
INTRODUCTION 
Originally and for many years, the primary defendants in asbestos cases 
were companies that mined asbestos or manufactured amphibole-containing 
thermal insulation.1  Hundreds of thousands of claims were filed against the 
major asbestos producers, such as Johns-Manville Corp., Owens Corning 
Corp., and W.R. Grace & Co.2 
By the late 1990s, asbestos litigation had reached such proportions that the 
U.S. Supreme Court noted the “elephantine mass”3 of cases and referred to the 
litigation as a “crisis.”4  Mass filings pressured “most of the lead defendants 
and scores of other companies” into bankruptcy, including virtually all 
manufacturers of asbestos-containing thermal insulation.5 
Following a 2000–2002 wave of bankruptcies among asbestos 
manufacturers,6 plaintiffs’ lawyers began “a search for new recruits to fill the 
gap in the ranks of defendants.”7  Many of today’s asbestos defendants are 
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 1. See James L. Stengel, The Asbestos End-Game, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 223, 
238 (2006) (noting “[a]s leading plaintiffs’ counsel Ron Motley and Joe Rice observed some 
time ago, the first seventeen asbestos defendants to go into bankruptcy represented” between 
50 and 75 percent of the liability share). 
 2. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION xxiv (2005), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG162.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GH43-275B] (“Approximately 730,000 people had filed an asbestos claim 
through 2002.”). 
 3. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999). 
 4. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997). 
 5. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 2, at 67. 
 6. See Mark D. Plevin et al., Where Are They Now, Part Eight: An Update on 
Developments in Asbestos-Related Bankruptcy Cases, 16 MEALEY’S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP., 
Sept. 2016, at 28, 40 chart 1 (demonstrating that there were nearly as many asbestos-related 
bankruptcies from 2000 to 2002 as in the previous two decades combined). 
 7. Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
525, 556 (2007); see also CARROLL ET AL., supra note 2, at xxiii (“When increasing asbestos 
claims rates encouraged scores of defendants to file Chapter 11 petitions . . . the resulting stays 
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formerly peripheral or new defendants associated with chrysotile-containing 
products “such as gaskets, pumps, automotive friction products, and 
residential construction products.”8  One plaintiffs’ attorney described the 
asbestos litigation as an “endless search for a solvent bystander.”9 
There is a remedy for workers and others with asbestos-related injuries 
caused by the former thermal insulation defendants and other companies that 
have exited the tort system through bankruptcy.10  As part of their 
reorganization, those companies established trusts that hold billions of 
dollars to pay asbestos claimants.11  Filing an asbestos trust claim is similar 
to filing an insurance claim—it is easier and faster than bringing a lawsuit.12 
 
in litigation . . . drove plaintiff attorneys to press peripheral non-bankrupt defendants to 
shoulder a larger share of the value of asbestos claims and to widen their search for other 
corporations that might be held liable for the costs of asbestos exposure and disease.”). 
 8. Marc C. Scarcella et al., The Philadelphia Story: Asbestos Litigation, Bankruptcy 
Trusts and Changes in Exposure Allegations from 1991–2010, 27 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.:  
ASBESTOS, Oct. 10, 2012, at 1, 1.  Chrysotile is “far less toxic than other forms of asbestos.” 
In re Garlock Sealing Tech., LLC., 504 B.R. 71, 75 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014); see also 
Rockman v. Union Carbide Corp., 266 F. Supp. 3d 839, 846 (D. Md. 2017) (“[C]hrysotile 
asbestos is classified in an entirely separate mineralogical family from amphibole asbestos 
and is widely considered less potent.”), appeal dismissed sub nom. Rockman v. Georgia-
Pacific, LLC, No. 17-1883, 2017 WL 7135451 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 2017); Bartel v. John Crane, 
Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 603, 605 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (“While there is debate in the medical 
community over whether chrysotile asbestos is carcinogenic, it is generally accepted that it 
takes a far greater exposure to chrysotile fibers than to amphibole fibers to cause 
mesothelioma.”), aff’d sub nom. Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Tr., 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
 9. Richard Scruggs & Victor Schwartz, ‘Medical Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation’—
a Discussion with Richard Scruggs and Victor Schwartz, 17 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.:  ASBESTOS, 
Mar. 1, 2002, at 1, 5.  More than 10,000 companies, including subsidiaries, have been named 
as asbestos defendants. See JENNI BIGGS ET AL., TOWERS WATSON, A SYNTHESIS OF ASBESTOS 
DISCLOSURES FROM FORM 10-KS—UPDATED 1 (June 2013), 
https://www.towerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/Newsletters/Americas/americas-insights/ 
2013/A-Synthesis-of-Asbestos-Disclosures-From-Form-10-Ks-Updated [https://perma.cc/ 
3FAC-JYDR]. 
 10. See S. Todd Brown, How Long Is Forever This Time?  The Broken Promise of 
Bankruptcy Trusts, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 537, 537 (2013) (“Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code 
authorizes the entry of an injunction that channels all of a debtor’s asbestos-related liabilities 
to a bankruptcy trust, which is established by the debtor to pay all valid current and future 
asbestos claims.”). 
 11. See Marc C. Scarcella & Peter R. Kelso, Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts:  A 2013 
Overview of Trust Assets, Compensation & Governance, 12 MEALEY’S ASBESTOS BANKR. 
REP., June 2013, at 33, 33–34 (describing how scores of former asbestos producers “have 
emerged from the 524(g) bankruptcy process leaving in their place dozens of trusts funded 
with tens of billions in assets to pay claims”). 
 12. See John J. Hare & Daniel J. Ryan, Uncloaking Bankruptcy Trust Filings in Asbestos 
Litigation:  Refuting the Myths About Transparency, 15 MEALEY’S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP., 
Apr. 2016, at 1, 3 (“Plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely advertise their ability to file trust claims 
‘quickly and easily,’ and tell potential clients that paralegals evaluate potential trust claims 
and undertake the filing process.  The evidence also demonstrates that trust claims are paid 
much more quickly than tort claims.”); Marc C. Scarcella & Peter R. Kelso, A Reorganized 
Mess:  The Current State of the Asbestos Bankruptcy Trust System, 14 MEALEY’S ASBESTOS 
BANKR. REP., Feb. 2015, at 32, 39 (“Unlike lawsuits filed in the tort system, the trust 
compensation process is intended to avoid the time, expense, and resource burden often 
associated with litigation.”). 
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One might assume that asbestos plaintiffs would obtain quick payments 
from the trusts while pursuing lengthier tort actions against solvent asbestos 
defendants that may have contributed to their harm.  Instead, many plaintiffs 
intentionally delay their asbestos trust claims until their tort cases are 
resolved.13  This tactic allows plaintiffs to suppress evidence of trust-related 
exposures that defendants could use to impeach plaintiffs, apportion fault to 
bankrupt nonparties, or prove that bankrupt entities were the sole cause of a 
plaintiff’s harm.14 
Further, “[i]n cases where defendants have been able to overcome the 
attempts to suppress evidence of other exposures, it has become apparent that 
the product exposures set forth in multiple trust claims differ markedly from, 
and are inconsistent with, the exposures being asserted by plaintiffs in the 
tort system.”15 
As this Article will demonstrate, there is a wealth of evidence proving that 
delayed trust filings and inconsistent claiming activity by asbestos plaintiffs 
are routine. 
Consequently, juries in asbestos personal injury cases are often misled to 
believe that the defendants taking part in a trial were responsible for all or 
most of the plaintiff’s harm.16  Jurors do not hear about all of a plaintiff’s 
 
 13. Peggy Ableman et al., A Look Behind the Curtain:  Public Release of Garlock 
Bankruptcy Discovery Confirms Widespread Pattern of Evidentiary Abuse Against Crane Co., 
15 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.:  ASBESTOS, Nov. 2015, at 28, 34 (“[T]wo prominent plaintiff 
attorneys in Garlock’s bankruptcy gave sworn deposition testimony that it is their practice to 
wait until the tort case has concluded to file bankruptcy trust claims.”); Joseph W. Belluck et 
al., The Asbestos Litigation Tsunami—Will It Ever End?, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 489, 511 
(2013) (quoting a New York City asbestos plaintiffs’ lawyer as stating, “we do not file the 
bankruptcy claims until after the case is resolved”). 
 14. See Daniel J. Ryan & John J. Hare, Uncloaking Bankruptcy Trust Filings in Asbestos 
Litigation:  A Survey of Solutions to the Types of Conduct Exposed in Garlock’s Bankruptcy, 
15 MEALEY’S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP., Aug. 2015, at 1, 2 (“[Asbestos claimants] attempt to 
shield their trust recoveries from disclosure in tort suits by concealing their trust claims or not 
filing the claims until the tort suit has concluded.”). 
 15. Lester Brickman, Fraud and Abuse in Mesothelioma Litigation, 88 TUL. L. REV. 1071, 
1088 (2014); see also Peggy L. Ableman, A Case Study from a Judicial Perspective:  How 
Fairness and Integrity in Asbestos Tort Litigation Can Be Undermined by Lack of Access to 
Bankruptcy Trust Claims, 88 TUL. L. REV. 1185, 1196–97 (2014) (“The absence of 
transparency continues to create a loophole that allows claimants to present contradictory 
theories of exposure and to manipulate causation evidence to fit the specific defendants named 
in the complaint or who are left standing at trial.”); Ryan & Hare, supra note 14, at 2 (“[T]here 
has been a recent focus on ensuring trust transparency in order to avoid the potential for abuse.  
The abuse occurs most often when claimants allege certain facts to support their trust claims 
and then allege inconsistent facts to support their tort claims.  For instance, claimants have 
alleged exposure to the products of bankrupt entities in their trust filings, but then ignore or 
flatly deny those exposures when they target solvent defendants in tort litigation.”); William 
P. Shelley et al., The Need for Further Transparency Between the Tort System and Section 
524(g) Asbestos Trusts, 2014 Update—Judicial and Legislative Developments and Other 
Changes in the Landscape Since 2008, 23 WIDENER L.J. 675, 679 (2014) (noting that claimants 
“make trust submissions based upon alleged exposure histories that are at stark variance from 
the tales they tell in the tort system”). 
 16. See LLOYD DIXON & GEOFFREY MCGOVERN, ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS AND 
TORT COMPENSATION xiv (2011), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/ 
2011/RAND_MG1104.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD89-7NZ3] (“When trust claims are not filed 
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exposures to asbestos, such as exposures to amphibole-containing thermal 
insulation that countless plaintiffs claimed as their primary source of 
exposure until those companies went bankrupt.17 
Because juries lack full information, solvent defendants end up paying 
inflated settlements and awards that disadvantage those defendants and 
future plaintiffs.18  Plaintiffs’ attorneys have essentially crafted a way to hold 
solvent asbestos defendants liable for more than their “fair share,” contrary 
to the policy decision of the many states that have abolished or modified joint 
liability.19 
In other states, juries are not able to allocate fault to nonparties, such as 
settling defendants, but defendants that lose at trial are given credit for 
pretrial settlements received by a plaintiff.20  This approach allows a plaintiff 
to obtain a full recovery from a judgment defendant without receiving a 
windfall due to settlements received from others before trial. 
Here, too, asbestos plaintiff lawyers have perfected a way to “double dip.”  
By delaying the filing of asbestos trust claims until after an asbestos-related 
tort case is tried, judgment defendants are denied setoffs for those trust 
 
prior to trial, defendants . . . might not have the information they need to assign fault to 
bankrupt firms.”); see also id. at 52 (“Submission of trust claims after termination of the tort 
case is desirable for the plaintiff because doing so can avoid disclosure of information that 
could aid in assigning fault to the bankrupt firms.”). 
 17. See Sarah Beth Jones et al., 2017 Asbestos Update:  Deposition Strategies for 
Developing Alternative Exposures, FOR DEF., June 2017, at 50, 51 (“Those bankrupt 
companies accounted for the bulk of the asbestos market.  In fact, one bankrupt company alone 
manufactured more than 50 percent of the asbestos-containing insulation sold worldwide.”); 
Scarcella et al., supra note 8, at 11 (“The results from the study of the Philadelphia asbestos 
cases indicate that while exposures to thermal insulation products remain prevalent among 
today’s plaintiff population, the identification of exposure to those products is greatly 
diminished compared to the claims filed prior to the Bankruptcy Wave that had comparable 
(or even identical) exposure histories.”). 
 18. See DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 16, at xv (“If . . . bankrupt firms are assigned 
less fault than would have been the case in the pre-reorganization scenario, total plaintiff 
compensation and payments by the defendants that remain solvent can increase.  In the 
extreme, the plaintiff can receive full compensation in the tort system and then receive 
additional compensation from the trusts.”); see also Editorial, The Double-Dipping Legal 
Scam, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2014, at A12 (“[N]ow we’re getting a glimpse of what has become 
a widespread tort-bar con.  Court documents show the ugly specifics of ‘double-dipping’—in 
which lawyers sue a company and claim its products caused their clients’ disease, even as they 
file claims with asbestos trusts blaming other products for the harm.  This lets them get double 
or multiple payouts for a single illness, with a huge cut for the lawyers each time.”). 
 19. See Laura Kingsley Hong & Robert E. Haffke, Apportioning Liability in Asbestos 
Litigation:  A Review of the Law in Key Jurisdictions, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 681, 682 
(2009) (“Many jurisdictions have abandoned the doctrine of pure joint and several liability in 
toxic-tort cases and have instead enacted systems for apportioning liability.”). 
 20. See DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 16, at 6 (“In tort litigation more generally, 
defendants often settle before trial, and, because those settlements are intended to compensate 
the plaintiff for the alleged harm, states often allow credit to be provided to verdict defendants 
for money the plaintiff has already received.”). 
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payments.21  A plaintiff can recover in full from a judgment defendant, then 
file trust claims and recover again from multiple trusts for the same injury.22 
Why should people care if gamesmanship by asbestos plaintiffs causes 
defendants to pay more than their fair share to a person dying of 
mesothelioma or some other serious asbestos-related disease?  The short 
answer is that it is unfair to those defendants, undermines the integrity of the 
civil justice system, and may hurt future claimants.  As an NPR story 
explained, “No one argues that people suffering from mesothelioma 
shouldn’t get compensated.  Instead, it’s a matter of the right companies 
paying the right amounts.”23 
This Article argues for legislation, such as that enacted in many states, that 
requires asbestos plaintiffs to pursue quick compensation from the trusts and 
allows trust-related exposures and compensation to be properly accounted 
for in asbestos-related personal injury cases.24  States with substantial 
asbestos litigation, such as California, Illinois, New York, and Missouri, need 
the legislation the most. 
I.  THE ASBESTOS TRUST CLAIM SYSTEM 
Over 120 companies have declared bankruptcy due, at least in part, to 
asbestos-related liabilities.25  In bankruptcy, many of these companies 
created trusts to pay for asbestos-related harms caused by exposure to their 
products.26  Approximately sixty trusts presently in operation collectively 
 
 21. See id. at 56 (“When trust claims are not filed prior to trial, defendants will not receive 
setoffs for trust payments . . . .”). 
 22. See id. at 52 (“Submission of trust claims after termination of the tort case is desirable 
for the plaintiff . . . because, although there are no setoffs for trust payments received after the 
tort case has terminated, there are setoffs to varying degrees for pre-verdict trust payments in 
some of the jurisdictions examined.”). 
 23. Michael Tomsic, Case Sheds Light on the Murky World of Asbestos Litigation, NPR 
(Feb. 4, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/02/04/271542406/case-sheds-light-on-the-
murky-world-of-asbestos-litigation [https://perma.cc/BF6L-N8ZB]. 
 24. Courts can accomplish similar reforms through case management orders. See 
Amended Pre-Trial Order No. 9 ¶ XIII(C)(7)(o)(2)(e), In re Mass. State Court Asbestos Litig., 
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 27, 2012) (“Within thirty days of trial, Plaintiff will serve a certification 
with the [court] that all known bankruptcy claims have been filed.”); see also Peggy L. 
Ableman, The Time Has Come for Courts to Respond to the Manipulation of Exposure 
Evidence in Asbestos Cases:  A Call for the Adoption of Uniform Case Management Orders 
Across the Country, 30 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.:  ASBESTOS, Apr. 8, 2015, at 1, 6. 
 25. See Chart 1:  Company Name and Year of Bankruptcy Filing (Chronologically), 
CROWELL & MORING LLP, https://www.crowell.com/files/List-of-Asbestos-Bankruptcy-
Cases-Chronological-Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/78WH-PRFL] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 26. Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism for such companies to 
reorganize, channel their asbestos liabilities into trusts, and emerge from bankruptcy with 
immunity from asbestos-related tort claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2012); see also Shelley, 
supra note 15, at 675–76 (“These trusts answer for the tort liabilities of the great majority of 
the historically most-culpable large manufacturers that exited the tort system through 
bankruptcy over the past several decades.”). 
112 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
hold billions of dollars to pay claimants.27  The reorganized companies are 
immune from asbestos lawsuits.28 
Asbestos trusts “compensate claimants expeditiously and at a minimal 
cost.”29  Further, because trust payment procedures are voted on “by the 
claimants through their attorneys, and the trusts often do not contest liability, 
it is much easier to collect against a bankruptcy trust than a solvent 
defendant.”30  One commentator has “even likened the trusts to a ‘piggy 
bank’ which asbestos attorneys can dip into at will.”31 
“In practice, a claimant seeking compensation from a trust must file a 
claim form, which . . . requires a statement of injury; information sufficient 
to establish asbestos exposure attributable to the trust’s predecessor . . . under 
penalty of perjury; and a determination as to whether the claimant is seeking 
expedited or individual review.”32  Along with the claim form, claimants 
submit documented evidence of exposure, such as a “work history, Social 
Security records, invoices, employer records, or deposition testimony of [a] 
claimant or coworkers taken in asbestos litigation,” and “medical reports or 
records sufficient to support a diagnosis for the specific disease being 
claimed or, if applicable, a copy of a death certificate.”33  Claimants may 
“electronically file bulk claim submissions against multiple trusts.”34 
If a trust determines that a claim meets the criteria for payment, the trust 
will make an offer based on a percentage of the “scheduled value” for the 
 
 27. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-819, ASBESTOS INJURY 
COMPENSATION: THE ROLE AND ADMINISTRATION OF ASBESTOS TRUSTS 3 (2011), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585380.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7HD-BSUD] (stating that, as 
of 2011, sixty asbestos personal injury trusts held assets totaling $36.8 billion among them); 
see also DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 16, at 2. 
 28. See LLOYD DIXON ET AL., ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS:  AN OVERVIEW OF TRUST 
STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITY WITH DETAILED REPORTS ON THE LARGEST TRUSTS 3 (2010), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR872.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L5ZT-Y2DC]. 
 29. Marc C. Scarcella & Peter R. Kelso, Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts:  A 2013 Overview 
of Trust Assets, Compensation & Governance, 12 MEALEY’S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP., June 
2013, at 33, 41; see also Dionne Searcey & Rob Barry, As Asbestos Claims Rise, So Do 
Worries About Fraud, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 11, 2013, 5:55 AM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424127887323864304578318611662911912 [https://perma.cc/M3GB-
77T7] (“Unlike court, where plaintiffs can be cross-examined and evidence scrutinized by a 
judge, trusts generally require victims or their attorneys to supply basic medical records, work 
histories and sign forms declaring their truthfulness.  The payout is far quicker than a court 
proceeding and the process is less expensive for attorneys.”). 
 30. Adrienne Bramlett Kvello, The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: How Borg-
Warner and Bankruptcy Trusts Are Changing Asbestos Settlements in Texas, 40 ADVOCATE 
80, 80 (2007). 
 31. Id. (quoting Cardozo School of Law Professor Lester Brickman); see also Thomas M. 
Wilson, Institutionalized Fraud in Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts, 13 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.:  
ASBESTOS, May 7, 2014, at 1, 7 (“[T]he trusts, designed by the same individuals who are now 
submitting claims, contain ‘loopholes’ allowing for ease of payment, often without the need 
for any real proof.”). 
 32. S. Todd Brown, Bankruptcy Trusts, Transparency and the Future of Asbestos 
Compensation, 23 WIDENER L.J. 299, 317–18 (2013). 
 33. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 27, at 18. 
 34. Scarcella & Kelso, supra note 29, at 42. 
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alleged injury.35  The general counsel of the Manville Trust has testified that 
the trust has no backlog and that an offer can be made within days after 
submission.36  After an offer is accepted, “payments tend to be made 
quickly.”37 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates that 
approximately 97–98 percent of trust claims are processed on this expedited 
basis.38  Only a small percentage of claimants reject scheduled payment 
offers and seek individual review in the hopes of obtaining more 
compensation.39  It is common for claimants to receive multiple trust 
payments since each trust operates independently and workers were often 
exposed to different asbestos products.40 
II.  ASBESTOS TRUST CLAIM MANIPULATION  
AND INCONSISTENT CLAIMING 
Plaintiffs can file claims with asbestos trusts and bring personal injury 
lawsuits against solvent defendants.41  In a bankruptcy case involving gasket 
and packing manufacturer Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC., a typical 
mesothelioma plaintiff’s recovery was estimated to be “between $1 and $1.5 
million, including an average of $560,000 in tort recoveries and about 
$600,000 from 22 Trusts.”42 
By delaying asbestos trust filings until a personal injury case is resolved, 
a plaintiff can suppress evidence of trust-related exposures that defendants 
could use at trial, including evidence that would attach fault to a former 
insulation defendant.  Delayed trust claim submissions also can deny 
judgment defendants setoffs they would otherwise be entitled to receive for 
trust payments to plaintiffs.  These practices were described in a watershed 
 
 35. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 27, at 17; see also Brown, supra note 
32, at 318. 
 36. See Deposition of Jared Garelick at 33:10–13, Cummings v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 13-
CI-006374 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Dec. 14, 2015) (“Claims are processed as they are submitted . . . .  
[T]he trust doesn’t have a real backlog.  Things are done in realtime [sic].  So as soon as a 
claim is submitted, it gets processed . . . .”). 
 37. Brown, supra note 10, at 555. 
 38. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 27, at 20 (stating that most claims 
are processed on an expedited basis with only “[2] to 3 percent of claims . . . processed through 
the individual review process”). 
 39. See Brown, supra note 10, at 554; Deposition of Garelick, supra note 36, at 37:2–
38:1. 
 40. Brickman, supra note 15, at 1078–79. 
 41. See LLOYD DIXON & GEOFFREY MCGOVERN, BANKRUPTCY’S EFFECT ON PRODUCT 
IDENTIFICATION IN ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY CASES iii (2015), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR907/RAND_RR90
7.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP6P-3VZJ] (“Plaintiffs now often receive compensation both from 
the trusts and through a tort case.”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 
27, at 15 (“Although 60 companies subject to asbestos-related liabilities have filed for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and established asbestos bankruptcy trusts in accordance with 
§ 524(g), asbestos claimants can also seek compensation from potentially liable solvent 
companies (that is, a company that has not declared bankruptcy) through the tort system.”). 
 42. In re Garlock Sealing Tech., LLC., 504 B.R. 71, 96 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014). 
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opinion, In re Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC.,43 by a federal bankruptcy 
judge in Garlock’s bankruptcy.44 
Historically, Garlock was a relatively small player in the asbestos tort 
system and was “very successful in settling (and rarely trying)” asbestos 
personal injury lawsuits filed against it.45  After virtually all thermal 
insulation defendants exited the tort system by the early 2000s, Garlock 
became a “focus of plaintiffs’ attention” because it was still solvent.46  
Garlock faced challenges defending itself in this new environment because 
“evidence of plaintiffs’ exposure to other asbestos products often 
disappeared.”47  The judge in Garlock said that this happened because of “the 
effort by some plaintiffs and their lawyers to withhold evidence of exposure 
to other asbestos products and to delay filing claims against bankrupt 
defendants’ asbestos trusts until after obtaining recoveries from Garlock (and 
other viable defendants).”48  The judge concluded that the missing evidence 
“had the effect of unfairly inflating the recoveries against Garlock.”49 
For example, in a California case that resulted in a $9 million verdict for a 
former Navy machinist mate, Garlock attempted to show that the plaintiff 
had been exposed to Unibestos amphibole insulation manufactured by 
Pittsburgh Corning.50  The plaintiff “did not admit to any exposure from 
amphibole insulation . . . and claimed that 100% of his work was on gaskets,” 
while his lawyer told the jury there was no Unibestos insulation on his ship.51  
Post-verdict, however, the plaintiff’s lawyers filed fourteen asbestos trust 
claims, including “several against amphibole insulation manufacturers.”52  
“And most important,” said the judge in Garlock, “the same lawyers who 
represented to the jury that there was no Unibestos insulation exposure had, 
seven months earlier, filed a ballot in the Pittsburgh Corning bankruptcy that 
certified under ‘penalty of perjury’ that the plaintiff had been exposed to 
Unibestos insulation.”53 
In a Philadelphia case that Garlock settled for $250,000, the plaintiff “did 
not identify exposure to any bankrupt companies’ asbestos products.”54  
Further, in answers to interrogatories, the plaintiff’s lawyers said the plaintiff 
 
 43. 504 B.R. 71 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014). 
 44. See id. at 82–87; see also Mt. McKinley Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., No. 13-
1639, 2015 WL 4773425, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2015) (“The evidence uncovered in the 
Garlock case arguably demonstrates that asbestos plaintiffs’ law firms acted fraudulently or 
at least unethically in pursuing asbestos claims in the tort system and the asbestos trust 
system.”). 
 45. In re Garlock, 504 B.R. at 73. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 73; see also id. at 84, 86. 
 48. Id. at 84. 
 49. Id. at 86; see also id. at 94 (stating that the withholding of exposure evidence by 
asbestos plaintiffs’ counsel was “widespread and significant”). 
 50. See id. at 84. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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had “no personal knowledge” of such exposure.55  Six weeks earlier, 
however, “those same lawyers had filed a statement in the Owens Corning 
bankruptcy case, sworn to by the plaintiff, that stated that he ‘frequently, 
regularly and proximately breathed asbestos dust emitted from Owens 
Corning . . . asbestos-containing pipe covering.’”56  In total, the plaintiff’s 
lawyers “failed to disclose exposure to 20 different asbestos products for 
which [the plaintiff] made Trust claims,” including fourteen claims supported 
by sworn statements that “contradicted the plaintiff’s denials in the tort 
discovery.”57 
The Garlock court also described a New York case that Garlock settled 
during trial for $250,000.58  The plaintiff denied any exposure to insulation 
products, but after his tort case was settled, his lawyers filed twenty-three 
trust claims on his behalf, including eight trust claims that were filed within 
twenty-four hours after the settlement with Garlock was completed.59 
In another California case that Garlock settled for $450,000, a former 
sailor denied that he had ever seen anyone installing or removing pipe 
insulation on his ship.60  After the plaintiff settled with Garlock, his lawyers 
filed eleven trust claims on his behalf, including seven claims “based on 
declarations that he personally removed and replaced insulation and 
identified, by name, the insulation products to which he was exposed.”61 
Since the Garlock decision was issued, numerous reports have confirmed 
that “[w]e are now past the time when [the case examples in Garlock] can be 
referred to as mere anomalies.”62  For instance, a 2015 study of almost 1850 
mesothelioma lawsuits resolved by industrial product manufacturer Crane 
Co. from 2007 through 2011 revealed “a similar pattern of systematic 
suppression of trust disclosures [as] was documented in the Garlock 
bankruptcy.”63  Utilizing publicly available discovery data from Garlock’s 
bankruptcy case, the study found that in cases where Crane Co. was a 
codefendant with Garlock, plaintiffs filed an average of eighteen trust 
claims.64  The study also found that “80% of these claim forms or related 
exposures were not disclosed by plaintiffs or their law firms to Crane in the 
underlying tort proceedings.”65 
A separate 2015 report revealed additional instances of “inconsistent 
claiming behavior and allegations between the tort and trust systems” by 
 
 55. Id. at 85. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Peggy L. Ableman, The Garlock Decision Should Be Required Reading for All Trial 
Court Judges in Asbestos Cases, 37 AM. J. TRIAL. ADVOC. 479, 488 (2014). 
 63. Ableman, supra note 13, at 28. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. 
116 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
plaintiffs.66  For example, a West Virginia plaintiff recalled the products of 
more than a dozen noninsulation defendants but could not remember the 
asbestos-containing thermal insulation products to which he alleged 
exposure.67  Plaintiff’s counsel eventually “filed claims against 20 trusts, a 
majority of which represent predecessor companies that once engaged in the 
manufacturing, distribution, or installation of asbestos-containing thermal 
insulation products.”68 
A 2016 study documented similar issues in Newport News, Virginia.69  
The study found that plaintiffs’ delayed trust filings in the cases sampled, 
which denied tort defendants access to “alternative exposure histories” 
present in the trust submissions.70  Further, Newport News plaintiffs 
“routinely deny or are unable to recall many trust-related exposures during 
personal injury cases” but nonetheless later file claims with those trusts.71 
A 2017 study of asbestos cases recently filed in Illinois provides further 
proof that “the failure by plaintiffs and their counsel to produce trust-related 
exposure evidence in a timely fashion in asbestos cases . . . appears to be 
systemic.”72  The study analyzed a sample of one hundred cases and found 
that only eight plaintiffs disclosed having made trust claim submissions, even 
though the average plaintiff in the sample could have made sixteen trust 
claims and thirty-seven of the plaintiffs could have made more than twenty 
trust claims.73 
More recently, a November 2017 bankruptcy filing by Bestwall LLC, an 
affiliate of Georgia-Pacific, LLC, described other instances where “asbestos 
plaintiffs, at a minimum, inconsistently and selectively disclosed exposure 
evidence to support or strengthen their cases against non-bankrupt 
companies.”74  For example, a Philadelphia plaintiff who sued Bestwall 
“identified no exposures to amphibole products” and “testified that he had no 
occupational exposure to asbestos whatsoever.”75  The plaintiff’s asbestos 
trust and bankruptcy filings “told an entirely different story.”76  He 
 
 66. PETER KELSO & MARC SCARCELLA, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE 
WAITING GAME:  DELAY AND NON-DISCLOSURE OF ASBESTOS TRUST CLAIMS 8 (2015), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TheWaitingGame_Pages.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P2B7-HMQB]. 
 67. Id. at 9. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See MARK A. BEHRENS, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, DISCONNECTS AND 
DOUBLE-DIPPING:  THE CASE FOR ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUST TRANSPARENCY IN VIRGINIA 
(2016), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/DisconnectsDoubleDipPaper 
_WebReady.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB89-5U6E]. 
 70. Id. at 3. 
 71. Id. 
 72. MARK A. BEHRENS ET AL., ILL. CIVIL JUSTICE LEAGUE, ILLINOIS ASBESTOS TRUST 
TRANSPARENCY:  THE NEED TO INTEGRATE ASBESTOS TRUST DISCLOSURES WITH THE ILLINOIS 
TORT SYSTEM 3 (2017), https://lrany.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Illinois-Asbestos-
Trust-Transparency-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF5S-EP6B]. 
 73. Id. at 12. 
 74. Informational Brief of Bestwall LLC at 20, In re Bestwall LLC, No. 17-31795 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.C. Nov. 2, 2017), 2017 WL 4988527. 
 75. Id. at 28. 
 76. Id. at 29. 
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“submitted no fewer than seventeen asbestos trust claims, all based on 
exposures not disclosed in his tort case, including claims against . . . trusts 
responsible for amphibole insulation.”77 
Additional inconsistencies regarding exposure history statements made by 
asbestos plaintiffs in tort cases and in trust claims have been uncovered in 
individual cases.  For instance, a Cleveland judge barred a prominent 
California asbestos plaintiffs’ firm from his court after he found that the 
firm’s allegations in court conflicted with documents submitted to 
bankruptcy trusts as to how their client had developed cancer.78  An order by 
the judge requiring the plaintiff to produce trust claims materials “effectively 
opened a Pandora’s box of deceit.”79  The judge later said, “I never expected 
to see lawyers lie like this . . . .  It was lies upon lies upon lies.”80 
III.  STATE ASBESTOS TRUST TRANSPARENCY LAWS 
Legislatures are responding to these problems by providing courts with 
greater information regarding plaintiffs’ trust-related exposures and claims.  
As of this writing, fifteen states have enacted asbestos trust claim 
transparency laws.81 
These laws generally require trust claims now routinely submitted after 
trial to be filed before trial and disclosed.82  If a defendant believes a plaintiff 
is out of compliance and can file additional trust claims, the defendant may 
file a motion with the court.83  In response to the defendant’s motion, the 
plaintiff may file and produce the additional trust claims, file a written 
response explaining why there is insufficient evidence for the plaintiff to file 
the additional trust claims, or request a determination that the cost to file the 
additional trust claims exceeds the plaintiff’s reasonably anticipated 
recovery.84  Should the court find that there is a sufficient basis for the 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Kananian v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. CV-442750, 2007 WL 4913164, at *19 (Ohio 
Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 17, 2007). 
 79. James F. McCarty, Judge Becomes National Legal Star, Bars Firm from Court over 
Deceit, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Jan. 25, 2007), 2007 WLNR 1527886. 
 80. Id.; see also Editorial, Cuyahoga Comeuppance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2007, at A14 
(describing the judge’s ruling as “required reading for other judges, who can start asking 
whether similar dishonesty is destroying the integrity of their own courts”). 
 81. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-782 (2018); IOWA CODE §§ 686A.1–.9 (2018); MICH. CODE 
ANN. § 600.3010–.3016 (2018); MISS. CODE §§ 11-67-1 to -15 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§§ 32-46.1-01 to -05 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.951–.954 (West 2018); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 76, §§ 81–89 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-66-1 to -11 (2018); TENN. CODE 
§§ 29-34-601 to -609 (2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 90.051–.058 (West 
2018); UTAH CODE §§ 78B-6-2001 to -2010 (2018); W. VA. CODE §§ 55-7F-1 to -11 (2018); 
WIS. STAT. § 802.025 (2018); N.C. SESS. L. 2018-4; H.B. 2457 (Kan. 2018).  In 2017, the 
National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) adopted model legislation mirroring 
West Virginia’s trust transparency law. See generally ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUST CLAIMS 
TRANSPARENCY MODEL ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF INS. LEGISLATORS 2017), http://ncoil.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2017/07/FINAL-asbestos.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ3L-WYLA]. 
 82. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 686A.3. 
 83. See id. § 686A.4. 
 84. See id. 
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plaintiff to file the additional trust claims identified in the defendant’s 
motion, the court shall stay the asbestos action until the plaintiff files and 
produces the trust claims.85  In the event that the court determines that the 
cost of submitting an additional trust claim exceeds the plaintiff’s reasonably 
anticipated recovery, the trust claim does not need to be filed, but the court 
will stay the asbestos action until the plaintiff provides a verified statement 
of his or her history of exposure, usage, or other connection to asbestos 
covered by that trust.86  The legislation also provides that trust claims 
materials are admissible at trial.87 
By requiring trust claims to be filed before trial, the legislation allows the 
tort system to properly account for all of a plaintiff’s sources of exposure to 
asbestos and compensation.  Juries in states that permit apportionment of 
fault to nonparties have more information and can place responsibility for an 
injury where it belongs.  In states that provide judgment defendants with 
setoffs for pretrial settlements, plaintiffs will continue to recover from 
defendants found liable at trial but will no longer obtain windfall recoveries 
by “double dipping.” 
Wrongdoers are held fully accountable for any harm they cause.  The 
legislation does not let any defendant escape responsibility for a harm it 
caused. 
Without reform, today’s asbestos defendants will continue to pay inflated 
settlements and judgments in many cases.  This is unfair and unsound.  As 
the Garlock case demonstrates, excessive liability can lead to bankruptcy88 
and “diminish resources that must remain available to pay legitimate future 
claims.”89  Further, plaintiff recoveries are substantially delayed while 
companies are in bankruptcy.90 
Greater transparency with respect to asbestos bankruptcy trust claims 
would also benefit future claimants by helping defendants identify 
inconsistencies that may signal an improper claim.91 
 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. § 686A.5. 
 88. See In re Garlock Sealing Tech., LLC., 504 B.R. 71, 86 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014); see 
also Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos:  A Multi-Billion-Dollar Crisis, 30 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 386 (1993) (economic dislocation drives firms to bankruptcy with 
substantial burdens on the “shareholders, employees, pensioners, and communities of asbestos 
defendants”); Joseph E. Stiglitz et al., The Impact of Asbestos Liabilities on Workers in 
Bankrupt Firms, 12 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 51, 70–88 (2003) (exploring the effect of asbestos-
related liabilities and bankruptcies on employment, retirement security, government finances, 
and other economic factors). 
 89. John J. Hare & Daniel J. Ryan, Sunlight is the Best Disinfectant:  Solutions to the 
Concealment of Asbestos Trust Filings in Tort Litigation, FOR DEF., Apr. 2016, at 55, 71. 
 90. See Stengel, supra note 1, at 260–61 (“RAND looked at eleven major asbestos 
bankruptcies and found that the average duration between filing and plan confirmation (which 
is the earliest date payments could start) was six years.  One case took ten years.  During these 
periods the trusts pay no money to claimants.  Furthermore, in the typical case plan 
confirmation itself can precede any payment by months, if not years, due to various startup 
delays.”). 
 91. A Wall Street Journal review of trust claims and court cases of roughly 850,000 
persons who filed Manville Trust claims since the late 1980s until as recently as 2012 “found 
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Finally, by accelerating the timing of trust claim filings, claimants will be 
able to obtain trust payments more quickly, rather than waiting, perhaps 
years, for a tort claim to settle or go to trial.  Plaintiffs also avoid the risk that 
waiting to file a trust claim could lead to a smaller trust payment because of 
a reduction in the trust’s payment percentage.92 
IV.  OPPONENT MYTHS DEBUNKED 
During debate on state asbestos trust transparency legislation, opponents 
have offered various myths that have been debunked in hearings and floor 
debate.  Some of the most frequently heard arguments raised by opponents 
are discussed below along with responses to those arguments. 
A.  Transparency Legislation Does Not Cause Delays 
When Ohio’s 2012 first-of-its-kind asbestos trust transparency legislation 
was being debated, opponents claimed that the legislation would result in 
endless delays and deny living plaintiffs their opportunity to be heard in 
court.93  These arguments have proven to be unfounded.  The Ohio law has 
resulted in “no appreciable delay in the prosecution of cases.”94 
When Texas considered similar legislation in 2015, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
again raised concerns that the requirements placed on plaintiffs would cause 
significant delays.  A partner with an influential asbestos plaintiffs’ law firm 
testified that requiring plaintiffs to file trust claims before proceeding to trial 
would “prevent dying mesothelioma victims from having their day in 
court.”95 
Texas plaintiffs’ attorneys now readily admit that delays have not 
happened.  At a September 2017 panel discussion held by the University of 
North Texas at Dallas College of Law, a partner of a significant asbestos 
plaintiffs’ firm stated, “It doesn’t really bother me that the act exists.”96  A 
founding partner in another major asbestos plaintiffs’ firm described the 
 
numerous apparent anomalies.” Searcey & Barry, supra note 29.  For instance, more than 2000 
Manville Trust claimants claimed occupational exposure to asbestos before the age of twelve. 
Id.  Hundreds of others claimed to have mesothelioma but alleged lesser cancers to other trusts 
or in court cases. See id. 
 92. Brown, supra note 10, at 577 (noting a “recent surge in payment percentage 
reductions”); Hare & Ryan, supra note 12, at 2 (stating that “trusts today pay, on average, 
approximately 50% of what they paid only 7 years ago”). 
 93. See MARYELLEN K. CORBETT & MATTHEW M. MENDOZA, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR 
LEGAL REFORM, WATCHING IT WORK:  THE IMPACT OF OHIO’S ASBESTOS TRUST 
TRANSPARENCY LAW ON TORT LITIGATION IN THE STATE 6 (2017), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/WatchingItWorkpaper_Web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KS8P-BA3L]. 
 94. See id. at 17. 
 95. Edward Slaughter et al., Two Years of Trust Transparency in Texas, IADC COMM. 
NEWSL. (Int’l Ass’n of Def. Counsel, Chicago, Ill.), Feb. 2018, at 1, 4 (quoting Bryan Blevins, 
Jr., a partner with asbestos plaintiffs’ law firm Provost Umphrey in Beaumont). 
 96. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Charles Siegel, a partner in the Dallas office of 
asbestos plaintiffs’ firm Waters Kraus & Paul). 
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impact of the Texas law on the resolution of cases as “largely 
inconsequential.”97 
West Virginia enacted trust transparency legislation in 2015.  Since that 
time, asbestos case filings have increased almost 25 percent in Kanawha 
County (which includes Charleston).98  Almost 40 percent of West Virginia 
plaintiffs in 2017 were nonresidents.99  One would not expect forum-
shopping asbestos plaintiffs to choose the Mountaineer State in large 
numbers if arguments raised against trust transparency had merit. 
In fact, rather than cause delays, trust transparency laws cure delays that 
exist today because of the tactics of asbestos plaintiffs’ lawyers.  As 
discussed, plaintiffs’ attorneys routinely delay the filing of trust claims while 
tort cases are pending.  This may produce a litigation advantage, but it can 
come at the expense of denying a dying claimant the opportunity to recover 
substantial trust claim payments while that person is alive.  Trust 
transparency laws speed trust claim payments to claimants and, by 
streamlining discovery, may make asbestos tort litigation more efficient.100 
B.  Alternative Exposure Histories Are Unavailable in Discovery 
Another argument frequently heard in debates about trust transparency is 
that reform is unnecessary because information about a plaintiff’s exposures 
should be available through ordinary discovery.  Theoretically, if plaintiffs 
were forthcoming in interrogatory responses and in deposition answers about 
all exposures to asbestos, trust claim information would simply reinforce 
those other admissions.  But when plaintiffs are asked about nonparty 
exposures they routinely say, “I don’t recall.”101 
 
 97. Id. (quoting Jeffrey Simon, a partner in the Dallas office of asbestos plaintiffs’ firm 
Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartless, PC). 
 98. See KCIC, ASBESTOS LITIGATION:  2017 YEAR IN REVIEW 4 (2018), 
https://www.kcic.com/asset/pdf/KCIC-2017-AsbestosReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PWQ-
K27U]. 
 99. Chris Dickerson, Kanawha Sees 24 Percent Increase in Asbestos Filings, W. VA. REC. 
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://wvrecord.com/stories/511368344-kanawha-sees-24-percent-increase-
in-asbestos-filings [https://perma.cc/Q75F-MTDT]. 
 100. See Hare & Ryan, supra note 12, at 2 (“The expeditious filing of trust claims helps, 
not hurts, people suffering from asbestos disease because it puts money in their pockets more 
quickly than delaying the claims until after trial.”). 
 101. See DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 41, at xii (finding that bankruptcy reduces the 
likelihood that interrogatories and depositions in subsequent tort cases will identify exposure 
to the asbestos-containing product of the bankrupt entity); Andrew T. Berry, Asbestos 
Personal Injury Compensation and the Tort System:  Beyond “Fix It ‘Cause It’s Broke,” 13 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1949, 1951 n.9 (1992) (noting that “after Johns-Manville went bankrupt in 
1982, plaintiff descriptions of Manville products . . . changed radically from a few months 
earlier”); Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class’s Theories of Asbestos Litigation:  The 
Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 138 (2003) (“Upon 
Manville’s bankruptcy, the prospect of a long delay coupled with expectations of considerably 
reduced compensation created a financial incentive for claimants to minimize the percentage 
of Manville products that they claimed exposure to, and instead allege exposure to asbestos 
products sold by solvent companies with the financial capability to promptly pay the full value 
of judgments and settlements.”); Scarcella et al., supra note 8, at 11. 
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Since asbestos plaintiffs are often testifying about exposures that occurred 
many decades prior, they often rely on their lawyers to refresh their 
recollection.102  Because asbestos personal injury cases are focused on 
solvent defendants, those are the only exposures the plaintiff’s lawyer has an 
incentive to discuss with the client.103  The result is that discovery in tort 
cases often yields incomplete information about a plaintiff’s trust-related 
exposures.104 
Further, the vast majority of asbestos trusts—65 percent according to one 
expert105—have provisions that facilitate inconsistent claiming activity.106  
For instance, many trusts include language that “expressly authorizes 
claimants to assert exposure histories that are inconsistent with 
representations made in the tort system.”107  Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law Professor Lester Brickman has explained that this language “vitiates any 
consequences of failing to identify product exposures in responses to 
interrogatories, depositions, and trial testimony in tort cases.”108 
C.  Wrongdoers Are Held Fully Accountable 
Some opponents have called asbestos trust transparency legislation a 
“bailout” for the “asbestos industry.”  This claim is particularly disingenuous 
because a purpose of trust transparency legislation is to properly account for 
the exit of the “asbestos industry” from the tort system.  Companies that used 
to be seen as peripheral defendants and newer defendants are “now bearing 
the majority of the costs of awards relating to decades of asbestos use.”109 
Perhaps more importantly, the legislation leaves wrongdoers fully 
accountable for any harm they cause.  Allowing a jury to hear about all of a 
 
 102. See Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 833, 
844–46 (2005) (discussing witness preparation techniques for product identification in 
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 103. See BEHRENS, supra note 69, at 16 (describing how an asbestos plaintiff admitted his 
lawyers showed him photographs of solvent defendants’ products before his deposition but no 
photographs of insulation products made by bankrupt companies). 
 104. See id. at 14 (reporting on a plaintiff who reached settlements with “16 asbestos 
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the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 14 (2012) (statement of Leigh Ann Schell, Esq., Kuchler Polk Schell Weiner and 
Richeson, L.L.C.). 
 106. See Kimberly Strassel, Commentary, Trusts Busted, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2006), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116527814374340591 [https://perma.cc/H5EX-XCNB] 
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 107. Brown, supra note 10, at 562. 
 108. Brickman, supra note 15, at 1105; see also Scarcella & Kelso, supra note 12, at 45 
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Distribution Procedures].”). 
 109. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES’ MASS TORTS SUBCOMM., OVERVIEW OF ASBESTOS CLAIMS 
ISSUES AND TRENDS 3 (2007), https://www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/asbestos_aug07.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6TVP-CV8X]. 
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plaintiff’s exposures to asbestos does not let any defendant off the hook for 
a harm it may have caused. 
D.  Trust Claims Are Not Settlement Agreements 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys sometimes assert that trust claims are settlement 
agreements and should, therefore, remain confidential.110  A former 
Delaware judge who supports asbestos trust transparency has explained the 
fallacy of this argument: 
The trust claims, and the payments resulting therefrom, are not the 
same as settlements with co-defendants and should not be treated as such.  
In a traditional tort suit the settlement privilege exists to prevent statements 
made in connection with negotiations from being used at trial, in order to 
promote free and frank discussions without the prospect that such 
admissions can be used against a party at trial.  But that privilege is neither 
necessary nor appropriate where the amounts of most trust payments are 
fixed by schedule and where the claim forms more closely resemble a 
complaint than a bargained-for agreement.  In this context, disclosure of 
claim forms cannot interfere with open discussions any more than filing a 
complaint can affect settlement in a tort case.  A standard application made 
online by a plaintiff to a bankruptcy trust bears no resemblance to the 
negotiation process that results in an agreement.  A plaintiff simply files 
and shortly thereafter receives cash.111 
An academic who is an expert on asbestos bankruptcy issues has also said 
that if a claimant submits the information the trust requests and is not 
pursuing an extraordinary claim value, the administrators of the trust “can 
take that information, they can process it, and they can assign a value 
according to a grid that has been established under the trust issue distribution 
procedures.  Once that is done there is really no negotiation, there is no 
settlement discussion to take place.”112  Courts generally take the view that 
a trust claim submission is “more analogous to a complaint than an offer of 
settlement or compromise” for purposes of discovery.113 
 
 110. Shepherd v. Pneumo-Abex, MDL No. 875, Civ. No. 09-91425, 2010 WL 3431633, 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010) (“Plaintiff objects to production of the information based on 
Federal Rule of Evidence 408, which prohibits the admissibility of information regarding 
settlements and negotiations ‘to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim.’”). 
 111. Peggy Ableman, “Me Thinks the Lawyers Doth Protest Too Much”—a Response to 
“The Irony of Tort Reform,” 32 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.:  ASBESTOS, Mar. 22, 2017, at 20, 28–
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 112. Belluck et al., supra note 13, at 505 (quoting S. Todd Brown, Professor, University at 
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 113. See Shepherd, 2010 WL 3431633 at *2; see also Sheppard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
No. 16-2401, 2017 WL 318470, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2017) (“Federal and state courts have 
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E.  Veterans Groups Have Supported Trust Transparency 
Lastly, it is important to clarify mixed reactions by veterans groups to 
asbestos trust transparency legislation.  Some veterans organizations aligned 
with the plaintiffs’ bar have opposed such legislation.  These groups might 
have the view that asbestos plaintiffs should grab everything they can get 
now, even if it means that a defendant pays more than its fair share. 
On the other hand, other veterans organizations have supported trust 
transparency legislation.  These groups take the longer view.  They appreciate 
that if defendants are forced to pay more than their fair share, then some will 
join the over 120 companies that have declared bankruptcy due to asbestos-
related liabilities.114  That is not sound long-term policy for defendants or 
plaintiffs.115 
Veterans groups that support the legislation also appreciate that requiring 
the timely filing of trust claims means earlier trust payments to veterans and 
a lower risk that trust payment percentages may shrink over time.116 
CONCLUSION 
Delayed asbestos trust filings and inconsistent claiming activity by 
plaintiffs are routine in asbestos cases today.  This occurs because of the 
disconnect that exists in many states between the tort and asbestos trust 
systems.  Defendants pay more than their fair share as a result. 
Reform is needed to provide fairness for defendant companies and help 
preserve assets for future asbestos claimants.  Excessive liability in asbestos 
 
 114. See Brown, supra note 32, at 306 (“Defendants who were once viewed as tertiary have 
increasingly become lead defendants in the tort system, and many of these defendants have 
also entered bankruptcy in recent years.”). 
 115. See Memorandum from Harold M. Burke Jr., State Adjutant, Veterans of Foreign 
Wars of the U.S., Dep’t of N.Y. Headquarters (on file with author) (“Thirty percent of 
mesothelioma victims are veterans.  The practice of double dipping based on false asbestos 
exposure claims endangers not only the trust funds designed to compensate victims but it 
drains the assets of private businesses who are the subject of these false claims.”); Letter from 
Steve Chesna, State Commander, AMVETS Dep’t of Wis., to Senator Lasee (Jan. 28, 2014) 
(on file with author) (“Contrary to what has been claimed, [trust transparency legislation] will 
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from unfairly having to pay more than their fair share.”); Letter from Royce Loesch, State of 
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to Senator Jim Stamas (Mar. 17, 2018) (on file with author) (supporting legislation that 
“provides the transparency all parties are seeking”). 
 116. See Belluck et al., supra note 13, at 509 (reporting that some plaintiff lawyers believe 
that they “have a duty to file [trust claims] quickly because if [they] do not then the payment 
percentages are going to go down and [their] clients are going to get less money from the 
trusts”); Hare & Ryan, supra note 12, at 2 (“[T]he current system in which plaintiffs delay 
filing trust claims substantially harms veterans and other plaintiffs because it not only deprives 
them of the quick and easy compensation paid by trusts but it also risks reduced recoveries if 
an applicable trust reduces its payments while a veteran delays filing his or her claim.”). 
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cases has led to scores of bankruptcies, and the litigation shows no sign of 
abating.117  Further, when companies are driven into bankruptcy, asbestos 
claimants may have to wait years for the creation of a trust.  The lack of 
transparency regarding potential inconsistent claiming activity also may hide 
fraud or other abuses that deplete defendant and trust assets. 
Finally, when trust claim filings are delayed by plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
plaintiffs with serious harms such as mesothelioma are deprived of what can 
be substantial trust recoveries while they are alive—money that could bring 
peace of mind to those persons and their families. 
States should address these issues by enacting legislation—as many have 
done—to require asbestos plaintiffs’ lawyers to obtain prompt compensation 
from the trusts and allow trust-related exposures and compensation to be 
properly accounted for in asbestos-related personal injury cases. 
 
 117. A 2016 review of asbestos-related liabilities reported to the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission by more than 150 publicly traded companies found that “[f]ilings 
remained flat at the levels observed since 2007.” MARY ELIZABETH STERN & LUCY P. ALLEN, 
NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RESOLUTION VALUES DROPPED 35% WHILE FILINGS AND 
INDEMNITY PAYMENTS CONTINUED AT HISTORICAL LEVELS 1 (2016), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2017/PUB_Asbestos_Litigation_Trends
_0217.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L3X-AB3B]; see also BIGGS ET AL., supra note 9, at 1 (stating 
that mesothelioma claim filings have “remained near peak levels since 2000”). 
